<# .Synopsis Disable Admin Shares ​ .Description Disable Admin Shares C$, IPC$, ADMIN$ to prevent remote access and local access via \\127.0.0.1\c$ from a browser, shortcut or cmd. Disabling admin shares will prevent ConfigMgr from deploying the client agent and remote administrative access. ​ .Version #> #AutoShareWks New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters' -name AutoShareWks -PropertyType DWORD -Value 0 ​ #AutoShareServer New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters' -name AutoShareServer -PropertyType DWORD -Value 0

When delving into the intricate workings of Windows file system architecture, one of the more technical concepts that often emerges is file altitude. If you’ve ever explored file system filter drivers or engaged in low-level system development, understanding this concept is crucial. This blog aims to break down the complexities of Windows file altitude, the role it plays in the kernel, and how it affects file system operations.   What is a Windows File System Filter Driver?  Before diving into file altitude, it’s essential to understand the role of file system filter drivers. In Windows, a filter driver operates within the kernel mode and can monitor, modify, or extend the functionality of file system operations. These drivers can be inserted into the I/O request path, between the application and the underlying file system, to intercept and possibly modify file operations such as read, write, and delete requests.   File system filter drivers are typically used for:  Antivirus solutions: to monitor and block malicious activities. File encryption or compression: to apply encryption or compression on the fly. Backup solutions: to intercept and manage file access for consistent backups. File system auditing or monitoring: for logging file system activities or imposing policies.   Introducing the Concept of File Altitude  In a system where multiple filter drivers are installed, there needs to be a way to define their order of operation. This is where altitude comes into play. Simply put, file altitude is a numerical value that dictates the position of a filter driver within the file system stack. The higher the altitude, the closer a driver is to the application layer (and further from the actual file system).   Windows ensures that these altitudes are registered and properly sequenced to avoid conflicts between drivers that might need to operate in a specific order.   How Altitude Works  Imagine a scenario where multiple drivers are installed for various purposes (e.g., an antivirus, a backup tool, and a logging tool). These drivers all want to interact with I/O requests. Without an ordering mechanism, there could be conflicts:   An antivirus might want to inspect a file before any backup software reads it. The backup software might need to know the original state of a file before encryption is applied.   Altitude values help resolve this by assigning each filter driver a priority based on its altitude. Windows ensures that the drivers with the highest altitudes receive I/O requests first, while those with lower altitudes are closer to the file system (and see the request last).   Altitude Numbering System  The altitude value is a floating-point number ranging from 0.000000 to 999999.999999. By convention, the lower the altitude number, the closer the driver is to the file system itself, and the higher the number, the closer it is to user mode operations.   Upper-range altitudes (e.g., 380000-499999) are typically reserved for drivers like encryption and compression tools that need to operate closer to user-mode applications. Middle-range altitudes (e.g., 200000-379999) are often used by antivirus software, which needs to filter I/O requests before they reach the disk. Lower-range altitudes (e.g., 0-199999) are usually occupied by drivers that need to interact closely with the file system itself, such as volume managers and file system encryption.   Each filter driver registered with the system must provide a unique altitude to prevent collisions or ordering issues.   Managing Altitude in Windows The Windows OS provides a centralized mechanism for managing filter driver altitudes. Filter Manager, a built-in component of Windows starting from Windows Server 2003, facilitates the registration and sequencing of these filter drivers. It ensures that drivers operate in the correct order based on their altitude, preventing lower-altitude drivers from inadvertently disrupting higher-altitude ones.   Querying Altitude  You can query a system's file system filter driver altitudes using the `fltmc` utility in the command prompt. This utility displays loaded filter drivers, their altitudes, and their current operational state.   fltmc filter   The output of this command might look like: Registering a Driver with an Altitude  When developing or installing a new file system filter driver, you need to register the driver with an appropriate altitude to ensure that it functions correctly within the filter stack. The driver installation process typically handles this via INF files or registry entries.   Altitudes are not chosen arbitrarily; they are managed and assigned by Microsoft. Developers must register for an altitude by contacting Microsoft’s filter manager team to ensure that no two drivers conflict by using the same altitude.   Handling Altitude Conflicts  Altitude conflicts can arise when two or more drivers attempt to register for the same or similar altitudes, especially if one driver isn’t aware of the other. If a conflict occurs:   It can lead to unpredictable system behavior, including I/O request handling errors. In worst-case scenarios, it could result in BSODs (Blue Screens of Death) due to improper sequencing of I/O operations.   By adhering to the altitude registration process, conflicts are minimized. The filter manager enforces altitude uniqueness to prevent these kinds of operational failures.   Practical Example: Antivirus and Backup Solutions  Consider a scenario where an antivirus solution and a backup tool are installed on the same machine:   Antivirus Filter: This filter driver operates at an altitude of 350000. When an application requests to read or write a file, the antivirus filter intercepts the request first. It scans the file for malicious content before passing it down the stack.   Backup Filter: This filter driver is at altitude 250000. After the antivirus completes its scanning, the request moves to the backup filter, which monitors the file for any changes, making a backup copy if necessary.   File System Operations: Finally, the request is passed down to the actual file system, which handles the physical read or write operations.   Without the correct altitude order, the backup software might try to back up a file before it has been scanned by the antivirus software, potentially saving a corrupted or infected file.   Conclusion  In summary, file altitude is a critical mechanism in the Windows file system architecture that governs the order in which filter drivers process I/O requests. By assigning a specific altitude to each filter driver, Windows ensures that drivers operate in the correct sequence, minimizing conflicts and ensuring the integrity of file system operations. Whether you're developing file system tools or managing enterprise-level systems, understanding and properly handling file altitude is crucial for maintaining system stability and security.

Windows Autopilot's Device Preparation is it's new 'user-driven' workflow. Instead of IT staff registering all devices prior to giving them over to staff there's the option for the device to be shipped directly from an OEM to the end-user. With minimal steps—powering the device, selecting locale, connecting to Wi-Fi, and signing in with Microsoft Entra credentials—the system automates the rest. The device automatically joins Microsoft Entra ID, enrolls in Intune, installs key apps, and runs essential scripts, streamlining setup for users while reducing IT workload. Key Features: The device joins Microsoft Entra ID. Intune enrollment with preconfigured policies. Automated installation of up to 10 essential apps and PowerShell scripts. This article covers the configuration steps for setting up Windows Autopilot device preparation using a user-driven Microsoft Entra join workflow. Requirements: Windows 11, version 23H2 with KB5035942 or later. Windows 11, version 22H2 with KB5035942 or later. Enrollment Config - Entra Navigate to Entra with the following URL, allowing users to enroll devices. https://portal.azure.com/#home Then to Device Settings, Microsoft Entra ID > Devices (left hand Window) > Device Settings. Allow 'All' users to join devices Enrollment Config - Intune Now navigate to Intune to configure the MDM User scope. https://intune.microsoft.com/#home Then to, Devices > Enrollment > Automatic Enrollment Select 'All' for the MDM User Scope. User and Device Group A couple of Groups will be required to allow named Users the ability to enroll devices and for the Devices themselves. From within Intune navigate to Groups. Create a Security Group with a name that reflects its purpose eg: AutoPilot_DevicePrepartion_Users. Add named users or all users to this group. Create a 2nd Security Group for devices, don't add any members. Modify the Device Groups Owners. Add the built-in service, provided by Microsoft 'Intune Provisioning Client' as the owner. This will provide the 'Just in Time' rights for device auto enrollment. AutoPilot Device Preparation Navigate to Devices, Windows, Enrollment. Select 'Device Preparation Policies'. Provide a Name. Add the 'AutoPilot_DevicePreparation_Device' Group. Under Configuration Settings leave the defaults. I've added some Apps and scripts, the maximum is 10. For Applications to install the user must be a member of the deployment group. Add the 'AutoPilot_DevicePrepartation_Users' group, these can be users who are part of the IT team that adds devices to Intune or all users. Save Deployment Sign in with an approved account, then sit back while the magic happens Links: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/autopilot/device-preparation/tutorial/user-driven/entra-join-device-group

<# .Synopsis Disable Admin Account and Sets Random Password ​ .Description ​ .Version #> #Password length $length = 20 ​ #Minimum number of symbols to use in the password #Do not set to high as this will remove complexity and make passwords easier to compromise $random = 5 ​ #Creates random password $assembly = Add-Type -AssemblyName system.web $randPass = [System.Web.Security.Membership]::GeneratePassword($length,$random) ​ #Var for Administrator Account $admin = "Administrator" ​ #Sets Administrator password net user $admin $randPass /YES #Disable Administrator account net user $admin /active:yes ​

​To set a time server by either IP or fqdn for non-domain joined clients. ​ For instructions on how to deploy from MDT (here) <# .Synopsis Set Time Server for non-domain joined clients (0x8) to fqdn's address ​ .Description ​​ .Version #> ​ Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\Parameters' -name NTPServer -Value "pool.ntp.org time.windows.com,0x8 time.google.com,0x8 " -Force ​ ​ <# .Synopsis ​Set Time Server for non-domain joined clients (0x8) to time server IP address ​ .Description ​​ .Version #> Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\Parameters' -name NTPServer -Value "192.168.0.10,0x8 192.168.0.11,0x8" -Force

It's standard for applications services to run with System. In many cases, this is excessive and leaves the Operating System vulnerable to escalation attacks particularly if there is an unquoted path or an unpatched vulnerability. ​ The following is a script deployable from MDT or SCCM for use on standalone and domain-joined systems. It's when the service account doesn't require a domain account but benefits from the least privilege and randomized passwords. The script creates a service account without any elevated privileges and adds to the 'Logon as Service' Right and then updates the Windows Service for the targeted application. ​ The password for each svc account is unique to prevent one compromised password from allowing all systems with that account and password combination to be compromised. Passwords are not written out to disk, otherwise its possible recover the files and password with recovery tools. ​ The github script is downloadable from (here) <# .Synopsis Update a Windows Service that is using system to a non-priv user account .Description List the service account name and name of the Windows Service to be updated. ​ Create the User account and strip out Local User group so its not interactive, set a randomized password ​ Update the Service with account and password ​ Export and update User Rights Assignments for the Service Account to have 'Logon as a Service' right .Version #> #List of Service Accounts (svc_) and the application the svc_ will run as a service $svc1 = @{"svc_splunk" = "splunk"} $svc2 = @{"svc_account2" = "Application2"} $svc3 = @{"svc_account3" = "Application3"} ​ $svcUsers = $svc1, $svc2, $svc3 ​ #Create Service Account, randomised password #Find Windows Service and update to use Service account foreach ($svcAcc in $svcUsers) { #Svc Account $svcAccount = $svcAcc.Keys #Application Name $appName = $svcAcc.Values ​ #Password length $length = 12 ​ #Number of random characters $random = 3 ​ #Creates complex random password for each svc account $assembly = Add-Type -AssemblyName system.web $randPass = [System.Web.Security.Membership]::GeneratePassword($length,$random) ​ #Create svc account with randomized password and unable to change own password. net user $svcAccount $randPass /PASSWORDCHG:NO /ADD /YES ​ #remove user group so its a service account and not able to interactively logon net localgroup users $svcAccount /DELETE ​ #if account needs access to read security events, normally if service account event forwards to SIEM if ($svcAccount -eq "svc_splunk") { #add to eventlog users group to read security event logs net localgroup "Event Log Readers" $svcAccount /ADD } #sets password to never expire WMIC useraccount where "Name='$svcAccount'" SET PasswordExpires=FALSE ​ #get the Windows Service based on the name of the listed App $svcName = gwmi Win32_service -Filter "name='$appName'" ​ #Update Windows Service so the svc account and password replace system service $svcNAme.change($null,$null,$null,$null,$null,$false,".\$svcAccount",$randPass) } #Hostname $hn = hostname ​ #Create new folder to export security template to $path = "C:\Logs\Services" New-Item $path -ItemType Directory -Force ​ #Export Security Settings inc User Rights Assignments with secedit.exe secEdit.exe /export /cfg $path\currentTemplate.inf ​ #List the current user account SID's for 'Logon as a service' $logonAsRight = Select-String $path\currentTemplate.inf -Pattern "SEServiceLogonRight" $origSids = $logonAsRight.Line ​ #Create an empty Template Add-Content -Path $path\newTemplate.inf -Value '[Unicode]' Add-Content -Path $path\newTemplate.inf -Value 'unicode=YES' Add-Content -Path $path\newTemplate.inf -Value '[System Access]' Add-Content -Path $path\newTemplate.inf -Value '[Event Audit]' Add-Content -Path $path\newTemplate.inf -Value '[Registry Values]' Add-Content -Path $path\newTemplate.inf -Value '[version]' Add-Content -Path $path\newTemplate.inf -Value 'signature="$CHICAGO$"' Add-Content -Path $path\newTemplate.inf -Value 'Revision=1' Add-Content -Path $path\newTemplate.inf -Value '[Privilege Rights]' ​ #array for new service accounts and their sids $svcSid=@() foreach ($svcAcc in $svcUsers) { #Service Account $svcAcc = $svcAcc.Keys ​ #Application Name for Service $appName = $svcAcc.Values ​ #new object for each service account $objUser = New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount("$hn\$svcAcc") $strSid = $objUser.Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]) $svcSid += $strSid.Value } #take original sids and add to new list of sids $sidOld =@() $sidOld += $origSids ​ #combined list of sids foreach ($svc in $svcSid) { $sidCombine += ",*$svc" } ​ #foreach sid add to the newTemplate.inf foreach ($sidIndi in $sidCombine) { Add-Content -Value $sidIndi -Path $path\newTemplate.inf -NoNewline } ​ #Run the SecEdit command to import the all accounts and add to Logon as a Service. secedit.exe /configure /db $path\secEdit.sdb /cfg $path\newTemplate.inf /log $path\newTemplate.log ​

The following tweaks are for disabling network features that are either legacy but still enabled or not required. ​ Each setting can be applied by running an elevated PowerShell directly or deployed from MDT or ConfigMgr. <# .Synopsis ​ .Description If IPv6 isnt deployed on the network should be disabled correctly via the Registry and not by unchecking the IPv6 component in network connections. ​ .Version #> #Disable IPv6 by setting 0xff, do not set fffffff as it slows down bootup New-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip6\Parameters' -Name DisabledComponents -PropertyType DWORD -Value 0xff -Force ​ ​ <# .Synopsis Disable LLMNR ​ .Description LLMNR or Responder should be actively disabled as it broadcasts the password hash and account name of the user or service account. Open Run and type '\\server\share' as this is very unlikely to exist the client will query the network by broadcasting on port 5355 containing your account with the password hash. Kali running Responder will pick this up and feed it into 'John the Ripper', ​ Block ports TCP\UDP 5355 both InBound and OutBound ​ Or set 'Turn on Responder (RSPNDR) Driver' to 'Disable' in GPO 'Computer > Policies > Administrative Templates > Network > Link-Layer Topology Discovery' ​ .Version #> #Disabled LLMNR New-Item "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT" -Name DNSClient -ForceNew-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient" -Name EnableMultiCast -Value 0 -PropertyType DWORD -Force ​ <# .Synopsis Disable both LMHosts and NetBios ​ .Description LMHosts is the legacy file used for name resolution. ​ NetBios is often enabled by default on Windows system but is legacy for SMB and Printer traffic, it can be abused leading to the system being exploited. Port 139 is used by Nbtstat to query for Windows devices. ​ Block ports UDP 137-138 both InBound and OutBound Block ports TCP 139 both InBound and OutBound .Version #> #Disable LMHOSTS File in Network Settings $lmhost = @{ { DNSEnabledForWINSResolution = $false WINSEnableLMHostsLookup = $false } Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName win32_networkadapterconfiguration -methodName enableWins -Arguments $lmhost #Disable NetBios in Network Settings $netbios = Get-ChildItem -Recurse "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NetBT\Parameters\Interfaces" | where {$_.property -eq "NetBiosOptions"} foreach ($op in $netbios) { cd hklm: $opPath = $op.Name.Replace("HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE","HKLM:") Set-ItemProperty $opPath -name NetBiosOptions -Value 2 -Force } ​ ​ ​ <# .Synopsis Disable Universal Plug and Play for network devices ​ .Description uPnP allows devices to discover and share data with other network devices, there is a small risk of this service being abused. Its a small but potential risk, more importantly it's a service that isn't needed, so it's disabled ​ Block port TCP 5000 Inbound Block port UDP 1901 Inbound ​ Stopping 'UPnP Device Host' Windows Service ​ .Version #> #Disable uPnP (Network Discovery) Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\LLTD" -name AllowLLTDIOOnDomain -Value 0 -Force Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\LLTD" -name AllowLLTDIOOnPublicNet -Value 0 -Force Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\LLTD" -name AllowRspndrOnDomain -Value 0 -Force Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\LLTD" -name AllowRspndrOnPublicNet -Value 0 -Force Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\LLTD" -name EnableLLTDIO -Value 0 -Force Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\LLTD" -name EnableRspndr -Value 0 -Force Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\LLTD" -name ProhibitLLTDIOOnPrivateNet -Value 1 -Force Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\LLTD" -name ProhibitRspndrOnPrivateNet -Value 1 -Force ​ ​

​There's been a few instances where setting folder permissions is required and I've found the following useful. ​ <# .Synopsis Change FOLDER permission for Authenticated User ​ .Description ​​ .Version #> ​ #Declares Inheritance $inherNone = [System.Security.AccessControl.InheritanceFlags]::None $propNone = [System.Security.AccessControl.PropagationFlags]::None $inherCnIn = [System.Security.AccessControl.InheritanceFlags]::ContainerInherit $propInOn = [System.Security.AccessControl.PropagationFlags]::InheritOnly $inherObIn = [System.Security.AccessControl.InheritanceFlags]::ObjectInherit $propNoPr = [System.Security.AccessControl.PropagationFlags]::NoPropagateInherit #Declare Auth User $user = "Authenticated users" #Path to Folder $path = "C:\SomeFolder" ​ #Return current permissions (get-acl C:\SomeFolder).Access ​ #Removes Inheritance $aclInh = get-acl $path $aclInh.SetAccessRuleProtection($true,$true) Set-Acl $path $aclInh ​ #Remove Permissions $getAcl = Get-Acl $path $fileAcc = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule("$User","FULL","$inherCnIn ,$inherObIn","None","Allow") $getAcl.SetAccessRule($fileAcc) $getAcl.removeAccessRuleAll($fileAcc) Set-Acl $path $getAcl #Add Permissions $getAcl = Get-Acl $path $fileAcc = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule("$user","READ","$inherCnIn,$inherObIn", "None","Allow") $getAcl.SetAccessRule($fileAcc) Set-Acl $path $getAcl ​ #Add a DENY permission $getAcl = Get-Acl $path $fileAcc = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule("$user","READ","$inherCnIn,$inherObIn","None","deny") $getAcl.SetAccessRule($fileAcc) Set-Acl $path $getAcl

Disabling Microsoft Windows Recovery Environment is a good idea because it reduces the risk of malicious software being installed on your computer. It also prevents unauthorized access to system files, which could lead to data loss or corruption. Additionally, disabling this feature helps prevent accidental changes to critical system settings that can cause serious problems and even render your computer unusable. ​ <# .Synopsis Updates Windows Boot and Recovery options ​ .Description Updates Windows Boot and Recovery options to prevent any boot options from being launched during the Windows boot. Windows will boot with a blank screen and provide no recovery options, This is one of a series of mitigations to prevent booting into PXE, Kali or Recovery options to perform attacks against the system. UEFI\BIOS - Update Boot order and remove PXE, USB and CD\DVD Boot Options UEFI\BIOS - Add a complex password to prevent unauthorised changed Bitlocker - Always encrypt the System drive with Bitlocker or alternative full disk encryption. Recovery Partition - Remove Recovery Partition from MDT\ConfigMgr disk configuration Bitlocker should be configured with TPM and Pin to prevent LPC (Low Pin Count) Bus sniffing attack ​​ .Version #> #disables automatic repair options for Windows cmd.exe /c "bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no" ​ #disables Windows Error Recovery screen cmd.exe /c "bcdedit.exe /set {default} BootStatusPolicy IgnoreAllFailures" ​ #disables all UI elements, logo, status, status messages cmd.exe /c "bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootuxdisabled on" #disables advanced startup options (F8) cmd.exe /c "bcdedit.exe /set {default} advancedoptions false" ​ #disables advanced startup option (F10) cmd.exe /c "bcdedit.exe /set {default} optionsedit false" ​​ #sets boot timeout out to zero cmd.exe /c "bcdedit.exe /timeout 0" ​ ​

By disabling Memory Dumps it's no longer possible to recover the dump file and extract secure data that is held in memory in the clear. ​ <# .Synopsis Disables Windows Memory Dumps ​ .Description ​ Disabled Memory Dump to prevent extracting cleat text passwords using WinDbg ​ 0 = None 1 = Complete Memory Dump 2 = Kernel Memory Dump 3 = Small Memory Dump 7 = Automatic Memory Dump (Default) ​ .Version #> Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl' -name CrashDumpEnabled -Value 0 -Force ​

There are 2 methods for hiding the C: or any other drive, GPO and a Regedt32 tweak. ​ There's obvious benefits preventing access to browse the System Drive like being able to Explore to a file and run it. However hiding C: needs to be considered as only part of the solution to prevent access. Its still possible to open PowerShell and cmd then 'cd' without restrictions, create desktop shortcuts to a named file and many others. Even after locking all routes down the audio control icon, assuming the user requires sound control provides a route into browsing the system. ​ There are,It's# .Synopsis Remove access to C: ​ .Description ​ Removes access to the C:\ by setting NoDrives and the value of 4 in the registry or set the User GPO settings 'Prevent access to drives from My Computer'. ​ .Version #> #Hides C for all users including Administrator New-ItemProperty -path 'HKLM:/SOFTWARE/Microsoft/Windows/CurrentVersion/Policies/Explorer' -Name NoDrives -PropertyType DWORD -Value 4 ​ #Hides C for the user the setting is applied against. ​ New-ItemProperty -path 'HKCU:/SOFTWARE/Microsoft/Windows/CurrentVersion/Policies/Explorer' -Name NoDrives -PropertyType DWORD -Value 4 ​ User GPO Settings ​

Device Guard has the following requirements: Hardware Requirements UEFI Native Mode Windows 10/2016 x64 SLAT and Virtualization Extensions (Intel VT or AMD V) TPM ​ Windows Features Windows Defender Application Guard (Isolation mode prior to 1703) Hyper-V Platform (Not required after 1603) Hyper-V Hypervisor ​ GPO Settings Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > Device Guard Turn on Virtualization Based Security (enable) Secure Boot and DMA Protection Enable Virtualization Based Protection of Code Deploy Code Integrity Policy (enable) C:\DeviceGuard\SIPolicy.p7b ​ (C:\DeviceGuard\SIPolicy.p7b is automatically copied and converted to C:\Windows\System32\Codeintegrity\) ​ From PowerShell execute Invoke-CimMethod -Namespace root/Microsoft/Windows/CI -ClassName PS_UpdateAndCompareCIPolicy -MethodName update -Arguments @{filepath = "C:\Windows\system32\CodeIntegrity\SIPolicy.p7b"} The system will create SIPolicy.p7b and a reboot will enforce Device Guard. ​ To create a Device Guard Policy run the following. ​ <# .Synopsis ​ .Description ​ .Version #> #Sets Working Folder for DG $CIPolicyPath = "C:\DeviceGuard" ​ #C:\DeviceGuard\InitalScan.xml $IntialCIPolicy = $CIPolicyPath+"\initialScan.xml" ​ #C:\DeviceGuard\SIPolicy.p7b $CIPolicyBin = $CIPolicyPath+"\SIPolicy.p7b" ​ #C:\DeviceGuard\CIPolicy.txt - Output from initial policy audit $CIPolicyTxt = $CIPolicyPath+"\CIPolicy.txt" ​ #Creates SIPolicy.p7b based on the IntialCIPolicy.xml New-CIPolicy -Level FilePublisher -Fallback Hash -FilePath $IntialCIPolicy -UserPEs 3> $CIPolicyTxt -ScanPath C:\ ​ #Enforces UMCI Set-RuleOption -FilePath $IntialCIPolicy -Option 0 #Enforcement Mode enabled Set-RuleOption -FilePath $IntialCIPolicy -Option 3 -delete ​ #Converts the audit to a p7b file copies to C:\DeviceGuard\ #GPO is set to move SIPolicy.p7b to C:\Windows\System32\CodeIntegrity ConvertFrom-CIPolicy -XmlFilePath $IntialCIPolicy -BinaryFilePath $CIPolicyBin ​ #Enable DG to enforce Invoke-CimMethod -Namespace root/Microsoft/Windows/CI -ClassName PS_UpdateAndCompareCIPolicy -MethodName update -Arguments @{filepath = "C:\Windows\System32\CodeIntegrity\SIPolicy.p7b"}